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 The court of appeals entered judgment on June 5, 2014. R. 21. Petitioner filed its Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari on June 24, 2014. R. 23. This Court granted the petition on October 15, 
2014. R. 24. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012).  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances. 
U.S. CONST. amend. I 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After earning her Ph.D. in English literature, Elizabeth Bennet was hired by the College 
of Southern Pemberley beginning the fall semester of 2008. R. 3. Bennet quickly endeared 
herself to students, who nominated her for teaching awards in 2009 and 2010, before winning the 
award in 2011. R. 3. The fact that Bennet’s class on author Jane Austen became the most popular 
course at CSP reflects her popularity as a professor and aptitude for teaching. R. 3. 
 In the spring of 2013, Bennet’s Jane Austen class included a student-athlete, Mr. 
Wickham, who transferred to CSP in the fall and joined the school basketball team. R. 3. 
Wickham’s athletic ability propelled the team to several achievements, including an invitation to 
a national tournament. R. 3. Outside of Bennet’s classroom, Wickham and CSP garnered 
unfavorable media attention. The local newspaper reported that Wickham was compensated in 
special treatment by CSP. Wickham was handed senior-only housing, excused from two 
midterms and the school dean ordered all of his absences excused, including the ones unrelated 
to the basketball team. R. 3. 
 Wickham’s exemplary athleticism was countervailed by poor academic performance. 
Wickham missed more than half of Bennet’s classes and his final paper on Pride and Prejudice 
was riddled with misspellings, incorrect grammar, and factual errors. R. 4. Bennet concluded that 
Wickham did not read the novel, and assigned a failing grade. R. 4.  
 Pemberley division athletic rules prohibit a student athlete from school sponsored 
athletics if the student has a failing grade on his or her transcript. R. 4. Bennet was ordered by 
CSP to change the grade to a “B” so that Wickham would be eligible to play in the invitational 
tournament. R. 4. Explaining that Wickham’s academic performance was inadequate to receive 
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any grade higher than an “F”, Bennet refused to change the grade, and thus endorse CSP’s lack 
of integrity and preferential treatment of a student athlete. R. 4. As a result of refusing to change 
the grade, Bennet was terminated from her teaching position at the end of the semester. R. 4. 
 Bennet brought a §1983 action, seeking an injunction requiring CSP to re-hire her and 
monetary damages in the District Court of the Southern District of Pemberley. R. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. 
§1983 (West 2012). In her complaint, Bennet alleged that by terminating her employment for 
refusal to change the grade, CSP violated her rights to free speech and due process under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The 
district court granted CSP’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. R. 13. While the district court acknowledged that grades constitute speech for 
purposes of the First Amendment, the ownership of that speech ultimately lies with the college. 
On appeal, the Sixteenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that grades are 
symbolic speech deserving of first amendment protection. R. 20-1. CSP then filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari, which was granted on the following two questions: (1) are grades speech 
protected by the First Amendment, and (2) if so, does the doctrine of academic freedom extend 
to the university or the professor. R. 24. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I 
 This Court should hold for Bennet, because (1) a grade is speech protected by the First 
Amendment, and (2) compelled speech violates the First Amendment. A letter grade assigned by 
a professor is speech under the first amendment doctrine of symbolic communication. An 
academic grade satisfies this Court’s test for a constitutionally protected symbol: (1) it conveys a 
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particularized message, and (2) there is a high probability that it will be understood by its 
audience. Grades communicate a message equivalent to the writing of a formal, qualitative 
evaluation. Additionally, grades are quickly understood by all in the academic community. 
Bennet is the speaker of the grade, and as such, she deserves protection from compelled speech. 
Under the First Amendment, Bennet enjoys the right to choose and control the content of her 
message, and her right was infringed when CSP compelled her to change her message. 
II 
 This Court should hold for Bennet, because (1) the doctrine of academic freedom favors 
educational pursuits over mere athletic competition, (2) CSP failed to provide justification for its 
conduct, and (3) proper assessment cannot be achieved by administrative action. The policy 
concerns of academic freedom stress the essentiality of education to a democratic state, and in 
particular the doctrine enshrines professors as vital to the incubation of societal advancement. 
Bennet complied with all university standards and policies when she assigned the grade. Under 
an academic freedom framework, Bennet’s academic rights outweigh CSP’s athletic rights. 
Academic freedom extends protection on academic grounds, and CSP failed to provide a 
legitimate academic interest when it compelled Bennet to change the grade. Furthermore, the 
assignment of grades requires a synthesis of direct, empirical, and professional observation that 
cannot be achieved through bureaucratic decision-making. Professors are the only individuals 







I. GRADES ARE A FORM OF SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION, AND 
THEREFORE THEY ARE A PROTECTED FORM OF SPEECH 
Constitutionally-protected speech is a multi-dimensional concept. The Courts have heeded 
the First Amendment’s underlying values and concerns in order to protect the free expression of 
ideas in a variety of manifestations. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that 
the First Amendment protects the right to silence); Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410, 411 
(1974) (holding that the First Amendment extends protection to symbolic activity). Regardless of 
the venue or the content, constitutionally protected free speech is a sacred tenant of American 
society, and deserves serious attention. See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that a professor’s assignment of grades deserves “exacting First Amendment scrutiny”). 
The cornerstone of our educational system is the professor, who is entrusted to train, and 
evaluate tomorrow’s leaders. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (discussing 
how professors play a “vital role” in society because they “train our youth”). In order for our 
nation to remain on the cutting edge of industry and science, our educational system depends on 
the freedom to educate and evaluate students honestly, openly and freely. Id. at 250 (stating that 
professors must remain free to evaluate in order for students to acquire “new maturity and 
understanding”). Essential to the efficacy of our nation’s professors is their ability to educate and 
evaluate without the fear of unjustified infringement. Id. at 250 (warning that imposing a “strait 
jacket” of restrictions on professors would endanger the “future of our Nation”). 
A. Grades are symbolic speech under this Court’s holding in Spence 
  The grades assigned by a professor merit constitutional protection based on their status as 
symbols. As a symbol, the letter grade is subsumed under the first amendment doctrine of 
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symbolic communication. In Spence v. Washington, this Court defined the two elements of 
symbolic communication: (1) the transmission of a particularized message, and (2) where there is 
a high probability that the message will be understood by its audience. Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 
405, 410, 411 (1974). In Spence, this Court applied the doctrine to protect an individual who 
attached a peace sign to an American flag. Id. at 406. This Court reasoned that a clear message 
was intended by deliberately joining the two symbols. Id. at 410. Likewise, the Spence test can 
be applied to the present case to protect Bennet’s act of symbolic communication in assigning a 
particular grade. 
i. The First Prong: Grades communicate a particularized message 
In Spence, this Court applied a two-prong test for the determination of symbolic 
communication. Id. at 410-11.The first prong of the Spence test defines symbolic communication 
as the intent to convey a particularized message. Id. at 410. When Bennet assigned a grade of “F” 
to Wickham, the grade contained a particular message and subject. The grade was not a general 
statement intended for a general audience, but rather, when viewed in its academic context, the 
grade conveyed a message highly particularized to a specific situation.  
In addition to the particularized nature of the grade, the doctrine of symbolic communication 
requires that the symbol act as a message. Id. at 411. This component can be construed as a 
requirement that the symbol impart relevant and applicable information in a given context. See 
id. at 410. Bennet’s purpose in assigning an “F” was to convey the message that Wickham failed 
to display the requisite degree of academic competency in her course. R. 4. Both the grade 




ii. The Second Prong: A grade’s message will be understood by those who view it 
The second prong of the Spence test requires a high probability that the message will be 
understood by its audience. Id. at 411. In Spence, the symbolic meaning of a peace sign on the 
American flag carried a highly charged message given its historical and political context, and the 
significance of its message would have been recognized by those who viewed it in context. Id. at 
410. The letter grade assigned by Bennet was equally informed by the setting in which it 
occurred, and carried a highly charged meaning to the academic community. R. 4.  
The grading system tends to act as a common language shared throughout the academic 
community, and the final letter grade provides the bedrock of that language. While universities 
may implement various grading policies, there is broad agreement on a grade’s value. 
Institutions of higher learning are nearly unanimous in their recognition of an “A” as the highest 
level of evaluation possible and an “F” as indicative of “failing”. Variance in grading standards 
amongst universities do not radically affect the fundamental significance of a grade’s value. The 
grade Bennet assigned to Wickham would have been easily understood in spite of minor 
variables in grading practices. 
iii. Parate extends the doctrine of symbolic communication to the academic setting 
In Parate v. Isibor, the Sixth Circuit recognized that the doctrine of symbolic communication 
provides constitutional protection to a professor’s right to assign grades. Parate v. Isibor, 868 
F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989). The court reasoned that a professor communicates a “message to 
the recipient” by assigning a letter grade, and that the final letter grade is nearly identical to a 
“formal written evaluation”. Id. at 827. The Parate court concluded that a professor’s assignment 
of grades is entitled to first amendment recognition and consideration. Id. at 827.  
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Based on the two-prong test for symbolic communication applied in Spence and the Parate 
court’s recognition of a grade’s first amendment significance, this Court should hold that a grade 
is a form of symbolic speech, and therefore receives first amendment protection. 
B. Compelled speech is a violation of the First Amendment 
Bennet’s first amendment right to free speech was violated when CSP compelled her to 
change the grade. This Court has held in several prior cases that interfering with the content of a 
speaker’s intended message is an unconstitutional act of compelled-speech. Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Com., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1986); Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974). The Sixth Circuit has extended this doctrine to protect a professor’s assignment of 
grades. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989). 
i. The First Amendment protects the right to select a message’s content 
This Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s right to choose and 
control the content of his intended message, and remain free from compulsion. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, this Court noted that the First Amendment protects the speaker’s privilege to 
select the content of his message. Id. at 573. The Hurley court held that a state law requiring 
parade organizers to include in a parade a message they did not agree with violated their first 
amendment right to control the content of their message. Id. at 581. In Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo, this Court held that compelling newspaper editors to publish replies 
compromised the newspaper’s right to control its message. 418 U.S. at 258. In Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., this Court held that a utility company’s practice of 
including newsletters in their billing envelopes was protected speech, and that a state mandate 
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compelling them to include a third-party newsletter violated the utility company’s first 
amendment right to control the content of its message. 475 U.S. at 20-21. 
In the case at bar, Bennet has a first amendment interest in the message she sent by assigning 
a particular grade to Wickham. The record reveals that Bennet adhered to all university standards 
and policies in her grade assignments. R. 12. CSP would not have committed an infringement 
had the administration merely exercised its authority to assign Wickham a new grade. Parate, 
868 F.2d at 829. Instead, CSP compelled Bennet to change the grade, and thus alter the content 
of her message. R. 4. In essence, Bennet was ordered to say something she did not believe to be 
true. As recognized by this Court, Bennet enjoys the right to freely choose and control the 
content of the message in her grade assignments. 
ii. Parate protected a professor from compelled speech 
 
The Sixth Circuit extended the First Amendment’s guarantee to control a message’s content 
to a professor’s assignment of grades. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989). In Parate, 
the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a university would “severely burden” a professor’s “protected 
activity” in assigning grades by compelling the professor to change a grade. Id. at 828. 
Furthermore, the court stated that by compelling Parate to change a grade, the university 
committed an unconstitutional act of compulsion that “precluded him from communicating” his 
particular message to the student. Id. at 829. The Sixth Circuit concluded that such an act of 
compulsion was “unduly burdensome” as well as “constitutionally infirm”. Id. at 830. 
Similarly, Bennet suffered a violation of her first amendment guarantee to choose and control 
the content of her message when CSP compelled her to change Wickham’s original grade. 
Bennet deliberately and thoughtfully selected the content of her message when she chose to 
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assign an “F” grade in response to Wickham’s academic performance. R. 4. Bennet’s first 
amendment guarantee was violated by CSP when she was ordered to change the content of her 
message.  
Therefore, this Court should hold that the First Amendment grants Bennet the right to control 
her message, and by compelling her to change the grade, CSP infringed her constitutional 
guarantee of free speech. 
II. BECAUSE ASSIGNING A GRADE IS SPEECH BELONGING TO THE 
PROFESSOR, SUCH AN ACT DESERVES PROTECTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE 
OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The issue of academic freedom is of particular constitutional significance. Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (describing the First Amendment’s “special concern” for 
academic freedom). Academic freedom is a doctrine engineered by public policy concerns that 
aim to promote virtues of excellence in our institutions of higher learning. Id. at 603 (noting how 
the “transcendent value” of academic scholarship necessitates “safeguarding academic 
freedom”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (warning that without the 
freedom of professors to evaluate freely, our society will “stagnate and die”). Professors are 
vulnerable, yet indispensable cogs in the educational machine, and academic freedom has been 
instituted to shelter them from bureaucratic abuse. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (describing the 
“fearlessness of scholars” as “fragile” and imperative for “fruitful academic labor”).  
By granting constitutional protection to an academic grade, this Court would be preserving 
the integrity of our educational system. The grading system used throughout our nation’s 
universities requires a certain degree of predictability. When a university compels a professor to 
change a grade, the grade essentially becomes an expression of something not founded in reality, 
and thus injures the integrity and trustworthiness of academic communication. As a consequence, 
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if the university has a reputation of compelling professors to assign high marks to non-deserving 
students, then hard-working and talented students would suffer, because potential employers and 
graduate programs may view their transcript suspiciously. Allowing a university to compel its 
professors to change a grade would discredit our educational system. 
This Court should hold that academic freedom vests in Bennet, because doing so would be 
consistent with the policy concerns of previous opinions. The extension of academic freedom to 
Bennet is warranted by the fact that (1) accurate academic evaluation can only be achieved 
through the professor-student relationship, (2) the need to protect professors in the ethical pursuit 
of their educational mission is more important than permitting a university to subvert that 
mission for mere athletic competition, and (3) interference from the university without valid 
justification creates a mockery of honorable academic institutions. 
A. The doctrine of academic freedom was abused by CSP, and if viewed in context 
clearly favors Bennet 
In its motion to dismiss, CSP relied on the doctrine of the four essential freedoms as 
described in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy. R. 7 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
354 U.S. 234 (1957)). The four essential freedoms that appear in Frankfurter’s concurrence 
describe the authority vested in a university by the academic freedom doctrine: (1) a university 
should remain free to determine “who may teach”; (2) it should remain free to decide “what may 
be taught”; (3) it should have the ultimate authority to determine the method in which “it shall be 
taught”; and (4) it should remain free to decide “who may be admitted” to the university. Sweezy, 
354 U.S. at 263. This Court should reject CSP’s argument based on the four essential freedoms, 
because it was interpreted out of context and abused by CSP. R. 15-16. This Court should 




i. The policy behind the four essential freedoms concerns keeping academic pursuits 
free from restrictions  
The first point to note is that the four essential freedoms are not Justice Frankfurter’s own 
words, and are not a creature of judicial invention. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262. They were sourced 
from a talk given at a scholarly conference in South Africa, which advocated for the “free spirit” 
of universities in that country. Id. at 262. The statement quoted in Frankfurter’s concurrence 
addressed the urgent need for universities to remain free from church and state coercion, as well 
as the sciences’ dependence on free inquiry, and the university’s responsibility to provide a 
setting “conducive to speculation”. Id. at 262-63. 
When read in context, it is difficult to see how CSP’s actions are consistent with the 
statement’s policy concern. Justifying a grade change to keep an athlete competition-eligible on 
the notion of free spirit of inquiry insults the noble goals espoused in the quote’s sentiment. CSP 
abused these four essential freedoms by stripping them of their original context.  
ii. The four essential freedoms are rooted in academic grounds, and not collegiate 
athletics 
The second point to note is that the four essential freedoms empower the university only “on 
academic grounds”. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263. CSP’s motivation for compelling the grade change 
was to keep a student-athlete eligible for competition—a motivation hardly considered a valid 
academic ground. R. 4. CSP did not express a difference of opinion on Wickham’s performance 
or allege that Bennet violated university standards. The record indicates that CSP compelled 
Bennet to assign a “B” for the purpose of ensuring Wickham could participate in school athletics. 
R. 4. The record also reveals that CSP’s underlying motivation was the desire for increased 
enrollment and larger alumni donations. R. 3. These reasons are insufficient to override the right 
to free speech vested in a professor as described by the four essential freedoms. 
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Therefore, this Court should hold that academic freedom cannot protect CSP’s conduct in 
this case, because it did not act with a legitimate academic interest when it compelled Bennet to 
change the grade. 
B. CSP failed to provide valid justification for interfering with Bennet’s speech 
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the primary objective of academic freedom is to preserve 
the “free marketplace of ideas” and to shield the professor’s teaching method from the 
university’s “arbitrary interference”. Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. As noted by the Parate court, the 
doctrine of academic freedom promotes the rights of professors to educate and evaluate freely. 
Id. at 828. However, the court recognized the inevitable conflict between the professor’s 
academic rights, and the university’s right to manage itself. Id. at 830. The conflict of interests 
inherent to the academic freedom issue can be resolved through this Court’s balancing test in 
Pickering. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The test considers (1) the 
relevant weight of the employee’s right to free speech, and (2) the public employer’s interest in 
operational efficiency. Id. at 568. This Court should honor the academic freedom policies set 
forth in Parate, and weigh the factors of its Pickering test, and hold for Bennet because her free 
speech rights outweigh CSP’s arbitrary interference in the grade change.  
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public high school teacher was terminated from 
employment for criticizing school board financial decisions in a newspaper editorial. Id. at 566. 
This Court held that public employment may not be terminated as a result of speaking on issues 
of public concern unless the employer can show the employee knowingly or recklessly made 
false statements. Id. at 574. 
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The test applied by this Court in Pickering sought to strike a balance between the teacher’s 
right to express his opinion on “matters of public concern” and the school’s interest in 
operational efficiency. Id. at 568. Notwithstanding the fact that the present case does not involve 
a matter of public concern, the Pickering court provided a valuable balancing test applicable to 
the case at bar. Id. at 568. This Court provided the following factors for determining whether the 
balancing test would favor the employer:  (1) disharmony among coworkers, (2) attacks on 
loyalty and confidence, (3) impairment or prevention of regular operation, or (4) failure to satisfy 
the employee’s duties. Id. at 570-73. 
This Court should note that the factors offered in Pickering are non-existent in the case at 
bar, and by applying the test, the balance will clearly strike in favor of Bennet. The record is 
devoid of any mention that Bennet’s refusal to change the grade resulted in workplace 
disharmony or impaired the university’s ability to execute its daily operations. In light of the fact 
that the record lacks reasonable justification for CSP’s actions, Bennet’s right to free speech 
remains stronger than CSP’s right to compel a grade change on non-academic grounds. 
In Pickering, this Court clearly favored preserving individual free speech rights when the 
public employer could not show justifiable grounds for infringement. Id. at 571. As noted by the 
Sixth Circuit, the doctrine of academic freedom shields professors from arbitrary interference. 
Parate, 868 F.2d at 830. Therefore, this Court should remain consistent with the policy concerns 
in Pickering and Parate, and hold for Bennet. 
C. The present case is distinguishable from cases where the courts have held that public 
employees speak as proxies of their employers 
The argument that professors speak as proxies of the university when assigning grades fails, 
because the supporting case law is distinguishable from the present situation. In its motion to 
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dismiss, CSP relies on the Third Circuit’s ruling in Brown v. Armenti to argue that Bennet’s 
speech is exempt from first amendment protection due to her status as a university agent, and 
that the university’s authority to decide how courses will be taught includes the freedom to 
assign grades. R. 7-8 (citing Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69 (2001)). However, this Court should 
note that the Brown ruling is merely persuasive authority, and is distinguishable from the case at 
bar. The speech of assigning grades belongs to Bennet, because (1) the policy concerns of 
academic freedom override the public employee-employer relationship, and (2) a professor’s 
duty to assign grades does not inherently interfere with the university’s right to manage itself. 
CSP’s reliance on Brown is misplaced because it is distinguishable from the present case. 
The Brown court relied on the four essential freedoms listed in Frankfurter’s concurrence to 
Sweezy, and concluded that grading is a component of the university’s freedom to determine how 
a course will be taught. Brown, 247 F.3d at 75 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 
(1957)). Brown held that a public entity, such as a university, enjoys discretion in implementing 
and enforcing its own academic standards. Brown, 247 F.3d at 73. 
This Court should note the distinction between a university’s authority to establish grading 
standards, and the professor’s right to assign grades in compliance with those standards. As 
recognized by the Third Circuit in Brown, a university is not granted unimpeded authority to 
decide each student’s individual grade. See Brown, 247 F.3d at 74. The analysis in Brown merely 
posited that a university enjoys the right to create its own grading policies, and it was silent as to 
whether an individual professor is granted the right to assign grades within institutionally-
defined boundaries. See id. at 75. Therefore, a professor enjoys discretion in assigning grades as 
long as she complies with the university’s standards. 
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Additional support is found in other courts that drew a clear distinction between grading 
policies set forth by university administrators, and individual professors who work within the 
administratively-provided framework. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 
90 (1978) (comparing a professor’s “expert evaluation” with the inadequacies of “administrative 
decisionmaking”); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting the difference 
between conforming a professor’s “pedagogical style” to university standards and compelling a 
grade change against the professor’s “own professional judgment”). 
The record indicates that Bennet assigned grades consistent with the policies and standards of 
the university. R. 12. The situation would be different had Bennet violated CSP’s grading 
policies or contradicted the academic standards desired by the university administration. Parate, 
868 F.2d at 829, 830. However, the record is clearly void of any such violation. Bennet’s first 
amendment rights in the grade assignment remain intact, because she complied with CSP’s 
standards. R. 12. Assigning the “F” grade did not violate any employee-employer rules. Bennet 
remained free to assign grades pursuant to her official duties as long as she did so within 
institutionally-defined boundaries. This Court can remain consistent with previous decisions, and 
hold for Bennet. 
Therefore, consistent with the reasoning applied by other courts, Bennet remained free to 
submit her professional judgment in a final letter grade as long as she acted within the confines 
set forth by CSP.  
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, this Court should hold for Bennet, because (1) grades are protected by the 
First Amendment, and (2) the policies of academic freedom favor Bennet. The letter grade 
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assigned by Bennet contained a particularized message that would have been understood by its 
audience. Furthermore, her first amendment right to choose and control the content of her 
message was infringed upon by CSP’s act of compulsion. The doctrine of academic freedom 
aims to promote societal growth through virtuous educational service, and recognizes the 
indispensable role professors play in that pursuit. The fundamental policies of the doctrine are 
indifferent to student-athletics. The competition-eligibility of a student athlete is simply 
irrelevant to the noble intention of academic freedom. Additionally, accurate and honest 
evaluations of academic merit can only be achieved through the empirical, observational 
approach afforded to professors. An honest academic evaluation cannot be rendered through a 
bureaucratic procedure. This Court should recognize a grade’s entitlement to first amendment 
protection, heed the policies promulgated by academic freedom, and hold for Bennet. 
PRAYER 
 For these reasons, Respondent prays this Court will affirm the Circuit Court’s decision to 
reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
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